The Soviet-Afghan War of 1979 was the inflection point when Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), backed by U.S. funding, systematically cultivated jihadi infrastructure that evolved into today’s sophisticated terror network. This deliberate cultivation created fighters with diverse objectives — Kashmir-focused aggression, control in Afghanistan, sectarian violence, and ideological warfare. Recent data has confirmed a resurgence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism across the region. This analysis examines Pakistan’s entrenched terror ecosystem through OSINT, declassified records, and academic research.

Terrorist outfits which are said to have Pakistan support

A key outfit is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The LeT emerged in the 1990s as Pakistan’s premier proxy organisation against India; it operates under Hafiz Muhammad Saeed — a designated terrorist operating in Pakistan despite international sanctions. Its rigid command structure includes Zafar Iqbal, Muhammad Yahya Mujahid, and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi who was one of the masterminds of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 (he was ‘arrested’ but protected within Pakistan’s judicial system).

LeT’s infrastructure centres around its 200-acre headquarters complex, the Markaz-e-Taiba, near Lahore, with additional bases strategically positioned across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and around urban centres including Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi. Ideologically, the outfit adheres to the virulent Ahl-e-Hadith doctrine (a conservative faction with a strict adherence to the Koran) specifically targeting India, which it propagates through its network of 300+ madrassas across Pakistan. Intelligence confirms at least 16 documented training camps of the LeT across Pakistan and occupied territories. The group’s operational sophistication is demonstrated through attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks where 166 people were killed; the 2006 Mumbai train bombings (209 killed); and an indirect hand in the 2010 German Bakery bombing in Pune (17 killed), orchestrated by the Indian Mujahideen (SIMI).

LeT maintains transnational reach with recruitment networks identified in 21 countries, with dedicated cells both in Bangladesh and Nepal facilitating operations against India. Its financial architecture combines direct ISI funding, estimated to be around $25-50 million annually; gulf-based private donors from Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Pakistani diaspora contributions through Islamic charitable fronts; and business operations including commodity trading and real estate.

Then there is the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Established in 2000 by Masood Azhar following his ‘release’ during the IC-814 hijacking, the JeM represents Pakistan’s suicide terrorism capability. Azhar maintains direct control over the outfit along with his brother, Abdul Rauf Asghar, by handling operations through specialised wings — the Askari (military) wing for direct operations; Dawati (missionary) wing for recruitment and radicalisation; and the intelligence wing for reconnaissance.

JeM’s infrastructure centres around its fortified headquarters in Bahawalpur, Punjab, with satellite facilities. It also has seven major training camps in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, four in PoK, and has recently re-established camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The Balakot training complex, targeted by Indian airstrikes in 2019 but subsequently rebuilt, specialises in suicide attack training. Its ideology combines Deobandi fundamentalism (a movement within Sunni Islam) with an apocalyptic worldview glorifying martyrdom operations.

JeM’s operational history includes the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing where 40 security personnel were killed. The group pioneered fidayeen (suicide) attacks in Kashmir and have demonstrated sophisticated capabilities with respect to vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and military installation infiltration.

JeM’s financing includes the Al-Rehmat Trust front charity, which collects $10-15 million annually; trading companies and commodity businesses; protection rackets in Bahawalpur and surrounding areas; documented ISI funding through intermediaries; and real estate holdings valued over $30 million.

Supporting players and state support

Some of the less mainstream players in Pakistan’s terror network include the Haqqani Network which operates as a semi-autonomous ISI extension along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Led by Sirajuddin Haqqani — now Afghanistan’s interior minister despite a $10 million U.S. bounty — the network serves as both an ISI proxy in Afghanistan and a facilitator for anti-India operations.

Then there is the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), which emerged from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) defectors, with operational bases in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. Though ideologically opposed to Pakistani objectives, evidence suggests elements within Pakistan’s security establishment tacitly allow certain ISIS-K operations.

The Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) also functions as a specialised recruitment pipeline for Pakistani proxy groups, maintaining extensive networks within Pakistan’s religious seminary system, with over 60% of recruits channelled to LeT and JeM operations.

Therein, Pakistan’s relationship with terrorist organisations transcends allegations — it is documented through concrete evidence, defector testimonies, international intelligence assessments, and financial tracking. The ISI has operationalised terrorism as state policy through a three-tiered system — strategic direction and funding through specialised “S-Wing” units; operational support via retired military personnel; and by providing material assistance such as weapons, training infrastructure, and intelligence. Despite officially joining the ‘War on Terror’ post the 9/11 tragedy in the U.S., Pakistan has maintained a calculated policy distinguishing between ‘good terrorists’ (serving Pakistani interests) and ‘bad terrorists’ (targeting Pakistani assets). The consequences have been devastating — over 45,000 lives lost due to Pakistani hand in terrorism since 1990.

Pakistan’s persistent appearance on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” (2008-2010, 2012-2015, 2018-2022) is international recognition of its systemic failure to dismantle terror financing networks. The most damning evidence comes from Pakistan itself — former President Pervez Musharraf openly admitted to training terrorists for Kashmir operations, while former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif confirmed state support for terrorist groups. Recently, the current Pakistani minister for foreign affairs said that they have been doing the “dirty work” for Western powers for a long time. A similar statement was also recently made by Bilawal Bhutto.

Funding and radicalisation

The funds sustaining this infrastructure operate through sophisticated mechanisms designed for plausible deniability. Religious charities serve as the primary collection points, with 40+ identified front organisations raising $150-200 million annually. Other sources include state funding through classified budget allocations (estimated $100-125 million annually); money laundering operations through hawala networks, with major hubs in Dubai, Karachi, and Peshawar; narcotics trafficking along the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India corridor generating an estimated $75 million annually; and cryptocurrency, with inputs indicating $15+ million moved through crypto channels in 2023.

Despite FATF pressure forcing some regulatory changes, Pakistan has preserved these financial pipelines by simply renaming organisations while maintaining core networks.

Apart from the financial infrastructure, Pakistan’s terror network also relies on a sophisticated radicalisation apparatus. Pakistan has over 30,000 madrassas, with 10-15% of them directly linked to extremist organisations. Other modes through which terrorism is encouraged include curriculum in religious schools which often promote violent jihad, particularly against India; publications, websites, and social media channels disseminating extremist ideology; and a targeted recruitment of vulnerable youth from economically disadvantaged regions. This creates a self-sustaining radicalisation pipeline continuously replenishing terrorist ranks.

Evolution of the network

Pakistan’s terror infrastructure demonstrates remarkable adaptability. It first made its appearance in the 1990s through direct insurgency in Kashmir through the LeT and HUM. Then by the early 2000s, the JeM had also emerged as a specialised suicide attack outfit.

However, post-9/11, operations of such terror groups became more sophisticated with greater plausible deniability; they started integrating cyber capabilities and information warfare. The Taliban’s 2021 return to power in Afghanistan significantly emboldened this infrastructure. There has been a re-establishment of training facilities in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan; an increase in infiltration attempts along the Line of Control (2023-2024); and enhanced operational coordination between LeT, JeM, and Taliban-affiliated groups.

Thus, Pakistan’s terror infrastructure represents a deliberate, state-supported system that has survived for decades through deep institutional support within Pakistan’s security establishment, which views these proxy forces as strategic assets rather than terrorist threats. The April 2025 Pahalgam attack, killing 26 civilians and forensically linked to LeT operatives trained in Pakistan, demonstrates the enduring threat.

Such an infrastructure poses immediate danger to regional stability, particularly to India, which continues bearing the human cost of Pakistan’s proxy warfare. This is not merely a bilateral issue but a global challenge which threatens the rules-based international order. Effectively addressing this threat requires unwavering international pressure on Pakistan to permanently dismantle — not merely rebrand or temporarily restrain — these terrorist organisations and the state apparatus that sustains them.

Brijesh Singh is a senior IPS officer and author of ‘The Cloud Chariot’. Views are personal.